Instituting a Regional Syndromic Surveillance System: Barriers and Opportunities by Plummer, Lynanne
Syndromic Surveillance 1 
Instituting a Regional Syndromic Surveillance System: Barriers and Opportunities 
by 
Lynanne Plummer 
01 April 2005 
A Master's paper submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 
partial fulfillment ofthe requirements for the degree of Master of Public Health in the School of 
Public Health, Public Health Leadership Program. 
Approved by 
w'A :.., J~,: s.·:- ~IW 
Second Reader: William Williamson,7MPH 
Abstract 
Syndromic Surveillance 2 
Syndromic surveillance is a relatively new tool being explored for early detection of disease 
outbreaks in communities. To signal an early outbreak, syndromic surveillance utilizes non-
traditional indicators such as over-the-counter drug sales, physician and emergency room visits, 
laboratory tests ordered, absenteeism and calls to nurse hotlines or poison control centers. 
Methodological issues, costs, legal issues, technological issues and lack of rigorous evaluation 
may all be barriers to instituting syndromic surveillance within a local region. However, 
exploring the feasibility of developing this system within a region can bring opportunities for 
increased communication and understanding between public health, medical providers and the 
emergency response community. Nurses can be instrumental in facilitating this process. 
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Constant health threats from emerging infections and bioterrorism possibilities have lead 
to the development of syndromic surveillance systems as a tool for early recognition of disease 
patterns within a community. Public health began exploring syndromic surveillance in 1993 as a 
supplemental epidemiologic investigation process (Foldy, 2004). The Centers for Disease 
Control (CDC) defines syndromic surveillance as "an investigational approach where health 
department staff, assisted by automated data acquisition and generation of statistical alerts, 
monitor disease indicators in real-time or near real-time to detect outbreaks of disease earlier 
than would otherwise be possible with traditional public health methods" (Centers for Disease 
Control & Prevention, 2004). 
In the United States mandates exist that require healthcare providers to report specified 
communicable diseases, Traditionally these reports prompt an epidemiologic investigation to 
identify source and spread of the disease, and to control the outbreak. However, because the 
report is often initiated after a laboratory confirmed diagnosis, many days may be lost that could 
be crucial in the containment of the outbreak. The goal of syndromic surveillance is to reduce 
morbidity and mortality by identifying an outbreak at an earlier point in time to shorten the gap 
between illness onset and Public Health identification of, and response to, disease outbreaks. 
Syndromic surveillance utilizes non-traditional sources of information indicating illness, before 
an individual is diagnosed. Figure 1 on the following page from Minnesota Department of Health 
(Integration of Non, n. d.) illustrates the time gap reduction, which may be possible utilizing 
syndromic surveillance systems. This timesaving could be crucial in containing an outbreak. The 
time "saved" could be used to begin epidemiological investigation, mobilize resources and 
bolster the capacity of the community to meet increased demand on medical resources during a 
large outbreak. 
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A variety of non-traditional disease indicators and data sources are being explored for 
early detection of disease in a community. Commonly used data sources include physician and 
emergency room visits, hospital or ICU admissions, 911 and emergency medical service calls, 
over the counter pharmacy sales, calls to nurse hotlines or poison control centers, laboratory tests 
ordered, school and work absenteeism, and insurance billing (Henning, 2003). Less frequently 
used sources, due to increased time lag between illness onset and the report, include coroner's 
reports and case volume (Henning, 2003). Utilizing these sources, public health officials analyze 
data for deviation from the "expected" and significant variation triggers an investigational 
response. 
Syndromic surveillance systems can be either manual or automatic. Manual systems are 
time intensive, requiring personnel to input specific data into the system for analysis. Because 
they are labor intensive and the data is not used for other operational purposes, these systems are 
hard to sustain. "Drop-in" systems are manual active surveillance systems that do not require 
extensive technological infrastructure, and are put in place for a short period oftime, usually 
during high profile events. These systems analyze manually input data from emergency rooms 
and large clinics to rapidly evaluate an "unusual occurrence" during or immediately following 
the event. "Drop-in" systems are beneficial for short-term rapid disease detection and for 
reassurance that an outbreak has not occurred. They have been utilized at events such as the 1999 
World Trade Organization Meeting in Seattle, for the 2001 presidential inauguration, during both 
the Republican and Democratic National conventions, the Winter Olympics and in New York 
City following September 11th, 2001(Institute of Medicine, 2003). 
Automated syndromic surveillance systems are more frequently utilized. Although much 
harder to establish due to the technological aspects, these systems automatically transfer 
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electronic data normally collected by a variety of entities. Because this information is already 
being collected for routine business purposes, sustainability is high. The table below shows the 
advantages and disadvantages of the different types of syndromic surveillance systems. 
Table 1 
Types of syndromic surveillance~selected characteristics, advantages, and disadvantages 
Surveillance Type Selected Characteristics Advantages Disadvanta2es 
Event Based surveillance Active Develop relationships with ED Labor intensive 
"Drop -in" systems Defined duration staff and infection-control Not sustainable 
Emergency departments professionals Not scalable 
Large clinics Transportable to various sites 
Sustained surveillance 
Manual Active and passive Develop relationships with Labor-intensive 
Faxed based reporting hospital staff Difficult to maintain 
ED triage staff typically log Easy to initiate 24 hours, 7 days a 
and tally sheets Detailed information obtainable week 
Not sustainable 
Electronic Passive Can be scalable Need programming 
Automated transfer of Requires minimal or no provider and informatics 
hospital or outpatient data input expertise 
Use of data collected for Data available continuously Confidentiality 
other purposes Data are standardized issues 
Data mining oflarge 
collections or from multiple 
sources 
Novel modes of Passive Easy to use Requires provider 
collection Hand-held or touch-screen Rapid provider feedback input 
devices Can post alerts and information Not sustainable 
Novel data sources Active and passive Clearly defined syndrome Not an early 
Medical examiner data Can be supplemented with warning 
Unexplained death or severe laboratory data Unclear whether it 
illness data can be rapidly and 
broadly expanded 
Note. From "What IS syndrom1c surveillance?", by K.J. Henmng, 2003. Morbzdzty and Mortahty 
Weekly Report, 53, p. 9. 
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A multitude of syndromic surveillance systems has been developed globally with 
differing types of data, and variable methods of data collection and analysis. A brief overview of 
a variety of systems utilized in the U.S. follows. 
Svndromic Surveillance Tally Sheet 
Santa Clara County, California is utilizing this manual collection system. It utilizes eight 
syndromes. Hospital emergency room triage nurses indicate on a paper tally sheet 
whether at presentation the patient has none, one, or greater than one of the syndromes of 
interest. The information is collected multiple times per day and faxed to the health 
department. The public health department then inputs the data into a database and 
graphic displays are then generated (Bravata eta!., 2004) (IOM, 2003). 
Electronic Surveillance System (or the Early Notification of Community-Based 
Epidemics (ESSENCE) 
ESSENCE is a Department of Defense surveillance system developed in conjunction 
with the Centers for Disease Control, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 
Emergency Medical Associates ofN ew Jersey Research Foundation, New York City 
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, and Harvard Medical School and Harvard 
Pilgrim Health Care (Foster, 2004). ESSENCE collects data from all military treatment 
facilities worldwide to include 104 U.S. Department of Defense primary care and 
emergency clinic, 121 U.S. Army, 110 U.S. Navy, 80 U.S. Air Force, and 2 U.S. Coast 
Guard installations. This automated, near real time system collects information from 
non-traditional sources such as International Classification of Diseases, 91h Revision 
Modification (ICD-9-CM) codes, pharmacy sales, and emergency room chief complaints. 
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The data are analyzed to recognize patterns of disease and can detect concurrent 
infections throughout the world. This system has mapping ability and utilizes 179 
geographic clusters. It is HIP AA compliant and utilizes a secure website, which is 
password protected (Lombardo et al., 2003) (Foster, 2004). 
Early Aberration Reporting System (EARS) 
EARS is a CDC developed syndromic surveillance software system which has been 
widely utilized by U.S. city, county, and state public health departments and 
internationally. Data is collected from emergency departments, 911 calls, physician office 
visits, school and business absenteeism reports, and over the counter drug sales. The data 
is analyzed using a SAS platform, and the resulting tables and graphs are obtained from 
an HTML Website linked through a homepage. This tool is available at no cost from 
CDC (Hutwagner, Browne, Seeman, & Fleischauer, 2005). 
Rapid Syndrome Validation Proiect (RSVP) 
The RSVP system was developed in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Energy 
and Sandia National Laboratories (Zelicoff, Gimpson, & Robertson, 2002) and tracks 6 
different syndromes: flu like illness, fever with skin findings, fever with altered mental 
status, acute bloody diarrhea, hepatitis, and adult respiratory distress syndrome (Institute 
of Medicine, 2003). The data is collected by clinicians in a variety of medical settings. 
Medical personnel input data using touch screens. This system has been utilized both as a 
permanent system and as a "drop-in" system. The data is transmitted to public health 
officials and an automated warning signal can alert authorities to new trends in disease. 
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The officials can also post alerts to emergency departments through this system. This 
system has been utilized by New York City, California, Texas, and is being piloted in 
New Mexico currently (Zelicoff, Gimpson, & Robertson, 2002) (Herring, 2004). 
Real-time Outbreak and Disease Surveillance (RODS) 
The RODS Open Source Project has been in development at the University of Pittsburgh 
since 1999. RODS initially focused on developing surveillance from de-identified text 
entries of chief complaints at ER presentation and clinics, and collection of over the 
counter pharmaceutical data. In addition, it now contains modules which also collects 
electronic laboratory reports, laboratory orders, dictated radiology and hospital reports, 
and poison control center calls (Espino, 2004). In late 2002, the RODS system was made 
available to public health departments free of charge. It has a Web based interface with 
GIS capability. Multiple requests for technical support resulted in releasing the software 
under an open-source license and the creation of the RODS Open Source Project for the 
sharing of "knowledge and skills related to the software, including its design, installation, 
configuration, and customization" (Espino, 2004). 
National Retail Data Monitor (NRDM) 
This system was also developed by the University of Pittsburgh and has been operational 
since 2002. During system development it was hypothesized that because individuals 
frequently purchase remedies early in their illness, if these purchases were monitored and 
analyzed, disease could be detected earlier than monitoring physician visits. Using 
Universal Product Codes (UPCs), NRDM collects and analyzes daily sales of over the 
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counter medications. Data that includes zipcodes and medications purchased is analyzed 
and results can be accessed via secure Internet connections. Currently 40% of the nation's 
over the counter drug sales are captured by this system. NRDM is a free public health 
surveillance tool now being utilized by over 400 health departments in 44 states and 
Puerto Rico (Wagner eta!., 2004). 
BioSense 
BioSense is the third component of a national Bioterrorism initiative which was 
developed for early detection of disease outbreaks. It uses Public Health Information 
Network Standards (PHIN) for integration and data exchange with an outbreak 
management system. It collects real-time, diagnostic and pre-diagnostic data from clinical 
care data systems (Loonsk, Walker, & Rolka, 2004). The data includes Department of 
Defense and Veterans Administration ambulatory care and emergency room diagnoses, 
procedures, clinical laboratory tests and over-the-counter drug sales (Loonsk eta!, 2004). 
Barriers to Syndromic Surveillance These systems represent only a small fraction of 
syndromic surveillance systems available through public health collaborations or via the private 
sector. The multitude of systems available, each with different characteristics, is in itself a barrier 
to instituting a regional syndromic surveillance system. There are no standardized reports for 
comparison of system attributes to guide officials in selection of the most appropriate system for 
a regwn. 
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Furthermore, syndromic surveillance systems have not undergone rigorous evaluation. In 
guidelines for evaluating public health surveillance systems (CDC, 2001), the CDC recommends 
that all surveillance systems be evaluated using these major indicators: 
• Simplicity (ofboth operation and structure) 
• Flexibility (can be easily adapted to changing needs or case definitions) 
• Data quality (completeness and validity of data collected) 
• Acceptability (of the system to end users; participation of users) 
• Sensitivity (the proportion of cases detected or ability to detect outbreaks) 
• Predictive value positive (proportion of cases that have the health related event) 
• Representativeness (accurately describes the event in terms of person, place and time) 
• Timeliness (speed between surveillance steps) 
• Stability (the reliability and availability when needed) 
• Usefulness (contributes to prevention and control of disease) 
Bravata and colleagues reviewed over 17,500 article citations and 8,088 Web sites to 
ascertain the level of evaluation done on 115 surveillance systems developed for early detection 
of disease (Bravata eta!., 2004). The figure on the following page shows the results of their 
review. They concluded, "Because current evaluations of surveillance systems for detecting 
bioterrorism and emerging infections are insufficient to characterize the timeliness or sensitivity 
and specificity, clinical and public health decision making based on these systems may be 
compromised." (Bravata et a!, 2004). Although this lack of evaluation of current systems has 
been cited as a reason for caution in instituting syndromic surveillance systems, it does not mean 
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Figure 2 
Application of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention evaluation guideline to peer-reviewed reports of surveillance 
svstems 
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From" Systematic review: surveillance systems for early detection ofbioterrorism-related diseases", by Bravata, D.M., eta!, 
2004, Annals oflntemal Medicine, 140, p.916 
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that they are not potentially beneficial for early detection of disease in a community 
(Bioterrorism, 2002) 
Another barrier to instituting regional syndromic surveillance is the lack of consistency in 
definition of the syndromes themselves, and the postulated diagnosis from these syndromes 
(IOM, 2003). Currently there is no national standard (I OM, 2003). Many syndromic systems 
rely on data derived from ICD-9-CM codes, physician discharge diagnosis, or chief complaint of 
the patient. A study by Fleischauer and colleagues comparing these different methods has shown 
inconsistency in these reporting sources (Fleischauer eta!., 2004). In manual systems, because 
there is not standardization, physicians or other medical personnel may not know when to 
include a presentation, thus skewing the data. Furthermore, there may be problems transferring 
the data electronically, as there is no medical industry standard for data collection and utilization 
(Mandl et a!, 2004). 
The cost, in terms of personnel and information technology infrastructure, may also be a 
barrier to instituting a syndromic surveillance system. The medical system in the U.S. falls 
exceptionally behind industry in utilizing information technology (Bates, 2002). Many health 
care providers and clinics are not computerized, and those that are, utilize electronic data mainly 
for billing purposes (Bates, 2002). Utilizing a manual system for data input increases cost for the 
provider, and should therefore be avoided. As suggested by Sosin and DeThomasis, successful 
implementation of a syndromic surveillance system will be dependent on identifying systems 
already in place and utilizing data from every day transactions to lessen the burden on the 
provider (Sosin & DeThomasis, 2004). 
Local or regional public health agencies themselves often lack the infrastructure, both 
technologically and in terms of personnel with expertise in epidemiology and biostatistics. 
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Although bioterrorism funds have been useful in building infrastructure in local health 
departments, without qualified personnel reviewing aggregated or even pre-analyzed data, the 
system may not be effective or efficient. Signals of increased disease must be investigated. It 
takes a trained epidemiologist to recognize possible interfering factors contributing to a report 
suggesting an increase in disease. Hours of needless investigation with resulting increased costs 
may occur unless personnel are qualified. Conversely, a small increase in disease may need to be 
investigated but may not be recognized by personnel, allowing a larger outbreak to occur. 
Frequently technical support is not readily available. There is limited 
communication and interoperability between local, state and national systems of disease 
reporting. Although this issue is being addressed by the Public Health Information Network 
(PHIN) (Broome & Loonsk, 2004), the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System 
(NEDSS) (IOM, 2003), and ultimately the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
of 1996 (HIP AA) (Bloome, Horton, Tress, Lucido, & Koo, 2003), the lag in the development of 
interoperability is a barrier to many local health departments when trying to institute a syndromic 
surveillance system. 
Legal and political issues may also arise when trying to institute syndromic surveillance 
at the regional level. Due to the provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act of 1996 (HIP AA), physicians and other health care providers may be reluctant to provide 
surveillance data unless specifically required by law. Public health authorities in a few states 
have even experienced trouble with providers reporting communicable disease mandated by law 
(Drocjiuk, Gibson, & Hodge, 2004). To circumvent these problems, some localities have chosen 
to receive surveillance data stripped of individual identifiers by the provider. This solution 
imposes further resource demands on the providers, and slows the investigational response by 
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public health authorities. Utah has addressed this issue by expanding their communicable disease 
authority to include reports of specific syndromes by hospitals or public health authorities 
(Gesteland & Rolfs, 2004). 
Opportunities Although the barriers to instituting syndromic surveillance are many, this 
new tool also presents opportunities for communities to build collaboration, not only among 
health care providers, but also with those government agencies (law enforcement, disaster 
management) responsible for the safety of the community (Yuan, Love, & Wilson, 2004). 
Opportunities exist to educate the community as to the role of Public Health in disease and 
disaster management. Public health nurses can be invaluable in coordinating this effort given 
their planning skills, their communication skills, their expertise in disease control (Friends, 2003) 
and their community and professional connections. 
Nurses are employed by a variety of institUtions: at emergency or urgent care facilities, 
hospitals, schools, rehabilitation centers, physician offices and clinics, home health agencies, 
poison control centers, educational institUtions, correctional institutions and in multiple other 
industry and government work sites. Gaining the support of these nurses can be instrumental in 
building a community coalition. Educational seminars concerning disease outbreak and disaster 
management could be instituted at various nursing organizational meetings to motivate diverse 
nursing participation in disease control, and also in emergency response. Each of these nurses 
bring a segment of needed information to syndromic surveillance, whether through absenteeism 
reporting, disease recognition and follow-up, or through influencing organizations or providers 
to participate. 
To further mobilize the region, public health nurses should convene stakeholder meetings 
to identify specific local barriers to regional syndromic surveillance and resources available. By 
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including stakeholders in the planning process, a consensual plan can be developed that assures 
community and regional participation. Stakeholders would include health care providers and 
information technology personnel, medical care institution management, nurses from multiple 
disciplines, military partners, govermnent and emergency response authorities. Multiple issues 
would need to be addressed as shown in the following table. 
Table 2 
Issues in Developing Syndromic Surveillance Systems 
Syndromic Surveillance Systems 
The following issues must be addresses during the development of syndromic 
surveillance systems: 
• Is there legal authority to support the system? 
• What are the correct syndromes to monitor? 
• How are these syndromes defined? 
• What population should be under surveillance? 
• Wbich sources of data are most sensitive, specific, and useful? 
• How is timeliness ensured? 
• Are security and confidentiality requirements met? 
• What is the best method for detecting syndrome aberrations? 
• How are aberrations (disease clusters) prioritized and investigated? 
• Are there adequate personnel and laboratory resources available for 
investigations? 
• How will surveillance results be disseminated to those who need to know? 
From "Syndromic surveillance", by K. J. Henning, 2003. Microbial Threats to Health: 
Emergence, Detection, and Response, p. 290 (accessed 3/3/ 2005 at: 
http://books.nap.edu/books/030908864XIhtml/290.html.) 
l ; 
l 
l 
r 
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Other issues to be addressed by the coalition include assurance that all critical 
stakeholders are included. Automation of the system, review and response protocols, and 
developing a plan for expansion and evaluation (Lawson, Fitzhugh, Hall, Hutwagner, & Seeman, 
2004) must be agreed upon. Costs associated with instituting and sustaining the system would 
also need to be discussed. Grant funding for the project might be available through CDC, 
Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) funding or other Department of Defense 
grants. Ownership of each segment of the project must be explored and consensus reached. 
Research and Public Health Recommendations Syndromic surveillance is a relatively 
new concept and extensive research, evaluation and refinement still need to be done (Bravata, et 
a!, 2004) ("Syndromic," 2004). Sosin and DeThomasis at the CDC Epidemiology Program 
Office, suggest that CDC's Framework for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems for 
Early Detection of Outbreaks "be simplified and standardized to allow comparisons across 
systems and across outbreak detection approaches" (Sosin & DeThomasis, 2004). They suggest 
the need for: testing intact system performance to verify the "early warning" premise, validating 
the underlying assumptions for disease outbreak modeling, and instituting standardized 
descriptions. Furthermore, they suggest prioritization of a "limited number of measures which 
would likely be of value now until experience is gained with other measures". (Sosin & 
DeThomasis). Their incremental approach is shown in Table 3 on the following page. 
Conclusions Although syndromic surveillance systems remain under -evaluated, the theory 
behind utilizing data from non-traditional sources for earlier disease detection appears to be 
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Table 3 
Priority evaluation questions for early outbreak-detection systems 
1. How often does the system signal an event for further epidemiologic 
attention? 
a. What was the time period (e.g., 1 month)? 
b. What was the statistical threshold (e.g., p-value)? 
c. If the threshold has changed, explain why. 
2. How were sigll.als responded to? 
a. What percentage of signals were investigated through new data 
collection? 
b. What percentage caused increased reporting frequency from affected 
sites? 
c. What percentage conducted detailed manual analysis of any data 
available to the jurisdiction? 
d. What percentage conducted manual analysis of data from the system? 
e. What percentage were reviewed for data errors? 
f. What percentage of signals were ignored? 
g. What resources were directed to follow-up? 
3. How many outbreaks were detected through the system? 
a. How timely was detection relative to other systems? 
b. How timely was detection relative to the stage of the outbreaK? 
c. What were the agent, host population, and environmental conditions of 
the outbreak? 
4. How many outbreaks were missed by the system? 
a. What were the agent, host, and environmental conditions? 
b. How was the outbreak detected? 
5. What was the public health response to detection (e.g., no response, urgent 
communication to clinicians, or vaccination campaign)? 
From "Evaluation challenges for syndromic surveillance- making incremental progress", by D. M. 
Sosin & J. DeThomasis, 2004, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Review, 53(Suppl), p. 128 
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valid. Although several barriers to instituting a regional surveillance system exist for those in 
local health departments, many of these barriers may be overcome by collaboration with larger, 
on-going projects which offer data analysis and on-going technical support. Initiation of a 
regional syndromic surveillance will require dedicated personnel to mobilize the community to 
address the feasibility of instituting a syndromic surveillance system. Public health nurses can be 
instrumental in this effort with their knowledge of the community, their professional 
associations, planning and communication skills, and their knowledge of disease outbreak 
control. By developing a community collaborative effort, partnerships between public health, 
medical providers, and the emergency response community can be strengthened. The community 
can be further educated as to the role of public health, and all parties involved will gain a better 
understanding of each discipline's contribution to disease control and emergency response, and 
interdisciplinary communication will be facilitated. As suggested by Cochrane, "The 
partnerships that result from collaborative biologic surveillance projects might be more 
important than the projects themselves" (Cochrane, 2004). 
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